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 Russia’s aggressive steps against Ukraine constitute a grave threat to the territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty of the country, simultaneously undermining its 
new, post-Yanukovych government and instigating secession of Crimea. Moreover, 
Russian actions also pose a serious challenge to the post-Cold War international 
system as such. The Euro-Atlantic community cannot afford to accept either.   
 
 Out of many available historical analogies, the remilitarization of Rhineland by Nazi 
Germany in 1936 offers the best contextual guidance for the understanding of the 
current situation. Like Hitler eighty years ago, Putin is deliberately testing the limits 
of the system and wishes to use the resulting chaos and confusion to his advantage. 
This does not make him a totalitarian dictator, but it does warrant labelling Russia as 
a revisionist power.  
 
 Current revisionist posture is a direct result of failed socialization of post-Soviet 
Russia. Just like in Germany after WWI, incomplete victory of the West bred 
resentment over the results of Cold War which has been cleverly manipulated by 
Putin’s regime. What mattered for Russia, apparently, was the lack of invitation to 
join the new European order as equal, in the vein of post-Napoleonic France after 
1815 or West Germany after 1949. Without trying to assign blame, it is now clear 
that the partially accommodating approach by NATO and other Euro-Atlantic 
institutions was insufficient to irrevocably integrate Russia to the new system. 
 
 At this stage of the dynamics of Russia-West relations, the risks of inaction 
overweigh the fear of escalation. Putin’s moves must be resolutely countered. 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty should be firmly upheld 
through diplomatic and economic support and defence assistance. NATO and the EU 
should reconsider their lukewarm position on possible accession of Ukraine and 
other post-Soviet countries. International community needs to be reaffirmed that the 
basic tenets of post-Cold war international order still apply. 
 
 The goal is not to unnecessarily antagonize Russia but to signal to its rulers (and 
other would-be challengers) that rules of the game cannot be changed by force. After 
the current round of confrontation ends, the Euro-Atlantic community should 
reconsider its overall stance towards Russia and contemplate more effective ways to 
retry its socialization into the system. 
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NATO, Russia and the Crisis in Ukraine 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we will perhaps be able to judge the current developments in 
Ukraine, including Russia-backed attempted secession of Crimea, more dispassionately than 
the heat of the moment allows us. Or maybe not. No matter what perspective we adopt, it 
seems clear that Russian actions present the gravest, most profound challenge to the 
European order which came into existence since the end of Cold War. Much more is at stake 
than territorial integrity of a medium-sized country torn by grave internal struggles over its 
internal constitution and foreign orientation. 
 
In the face of these developments, NATO (and the Euro-Atlantic community in general) 
faces difficult questions and tough choices. Before making them, it helps to realize the 
context of recent developments and seek inspiration from comparable historical situations 
which can provide some insight into the dynamics of the conflict and offer guidance for 
necessary action.  
 
This paper will first assess the impact of Russian behaviour not only on Ukraine but on the 
European international system in general. Since the recent crisis provoked the emergence of 
several historical analogies, it will then critically assess their relevance and seek to locate the 
one with the best promise of useful inspiration. In order to understand the current situation, it 
is necessary to grasp the logic of previous development, which is closely connected with the 
reconstitution of the West-Russia relations after the end of Cold War. In this regard, 
experiences from previous resolutions of systemic conflict are most illuminative. Finally, 
and most importantly, the paper will assess the options NATO and the Euro-Atlantic 
community as a whole have at their disposal, and weigh their possible impact. 
 
 
Shock and Awe, Russian Style 
 
Conflict studies typically recognize two basic forms of incompatibility in interstate and 
internal conflicts – government and territory. With its recent actions against Ukraine, Russia 
has apparently instigated conflict in both domains, meddling into the fight between 
Yanukovych’s regime and its opponents and, after its protegé fell, starting a military action 
in support of Crimean separatists. Europe has not witnessed such an example of naked 
assault on the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity since the end of Cold 
War. To those willing to compare the situation in Crimea to Kosovo fifteen years ago, it is 
worth highlighting the differences: the Yugoslav province saw international military action 
only after years of brutal internal armed conflict (nowhere to be seen in Crimea); the 
intervention was not motivated by territorial claims (anyone recalls the US wanting to annex 
Kosovo?); the humanitarian intent may have been controversial but was manifestly not based 
on national affinity (where Russia talks of protecting “our people”, NATO talked of saving 
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“people”, full stop); the intervention was multilateral and backed informally by the UN 
Secretary General (hard to imagine in the present context);  and, finally, the separation of 
Kosovo came about as an unwanted outcome not welcome by many (NATO members 
remains split over this issue). This list does not make the Kosovo intervention less 
controversial, but sufficiently explains how starkly it contrasts with the current Russian 
actions and rhetoric. 
 
To predict the impact of Russian aggression on Ukraine itself is difficult (apart from the 
obvious conclusion that it can hardly be positive), given the internal cleavages which split 
the country. While Russia has proved surprisingly inept at keeping its man in charge of the 
country, it has enough resources and influence to mar Ukraine’s efforts (if they come) to 
mitigate the division between its pro-Western and pro-Russian factions. From the notorious 
Roman dictum divide et impera, Russia is only able to fulfil the first half. Putin’s regime’s 
intentions are in fact not clear: Apparently, it would like to keep Ukraine on close Russian 
orbit, yet this might not be achievable for the country as a whole – and will be less possible 
with every further Russian aggressive action. It is highly unlikely that Ukraine’s pro-Western 
forces would bandwagon, to use Stephen Walt’s term, which leaves the possibility of further 
fracturing of the country in play. Whether Moscow can expect pro-Russian feelings in 
eastern Ukraine strong enough to repeat the Crimean scenario is questionable, and so is 
Putin’s willingness to risk open military action whose gains, after all, would be highly 
uncertain. Better than direct control of part of the country might be an ability to influence the 
whole of it through continuous blackmail. 
 
This situation threatens to turn Ukraine into a major complication in Russia’s relations with 
the rest of Europe and the United States. Depending on the form of Russian meddling, 
Ukraine can fear to become a major problem anywhere on the scale between a frozen 
conflict à la Transnistria to a full-fledged combat zone resembling Yugoslavia at the 
beginning of 1990s. In the long term, Europe cannot to tolerate either. Ukraine is not on the 
outskirts of Europe’s international system, as Yugoslavia was two decades ago, and it is 
pivotal to Europe-Russia relations from many perspectives (including, but not limited to, 
geopolitics, identity or energy security). Its territorial integrity is vastly more important than 
that of Moldova, and even a ‘frozen’ conflict in its territory would be too ‘hot’ to tolerate. 
 
Moreover, Russian (or Russia-backed, which is not substantially different) grab of Crimea 
runs counter the principles which have long been cultivated as the backbone of European 
normative space – and to which Russia itself formally subscribed, even during the Soviet 
period through the Helsinki Final Act. Material implications of the new ‘Putin doctrine’ 
which claims the right for military protection of Russians in neighbouring countries, have 
direct relevance for the three Baltic states, thus touching on mutual security and defence 
commitments within NATO and the EU. Even if his doctrine is proven bluff, Europe cannot 
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ignore a man willing to directly challenge constitutive elements of its international order 
which his predecessors expressly acknowledged. 
 
It does not end with Europe. All other states will be watching closely how Europe and the 
US deal with the challenge which Russia staged. State-to-state armed conflicts, including 
those over territory, have almost become extinct over the past two decades – one of the most 
promising trends in the contemporary international system. But international relations is not 
physics, there are no laws immune from change, no processes which cannot be thrown off 
course. The US faces an increasingly difficult constellation in East and Southeast Asia where 
China has raised several territorial claims which can easily become new geopolitical 
flashpoints prone to further escalation. Conflicts in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait or 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have so far been contained at the level of diplomatic and legal 
wrestling. However, the restraint exhibited by the countries concerned does not only reflect 
the delicate balance of power in the region, it also stems from an adherence to the 
international norm prohibiting territorial aggression. If, however, China and other potential 
challengers of the established international order deem the US (and their European allies) 
unwilling or unable to insist on the compliance with this norm, the global consensus on the 
matter may quickly dissipate. In its own interest, the Euro-Atlantic community cannot afford 
to tolerate such an outcome.  
 
 
We Have Seen This Before – or Have We? Search for the 
Right Analogy 
 
Nothing stimulates a search for suitable analogies like an unexpected, shocking use of force 
in international relations. Political, popular, even academic discourses are littered with 
comparative example from recent and more distant past which are used to explain the 
situation and suggest a proper course of action. While not necessarily harmful, the use of 
analogies can lead to misleading suggestions which, if proven sufficiently catchy, can drag 
the public and political debate to unfortunate conclusions. What follows is a critical 
reflection on the recent discourse, wrapped up with an analogy deemed most suitable to fit 
the mould of current developments in Ukraine. 
 
Going counterclockwise, the first analogy which caught public imagination was the previous 
Russian military engagement in the near abroad, the 2008 war with Georgia over the 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While it is almost too easy to link the two 
to paint Russia as an inherently aggressive, territory-grabbing power, there are significant 
differences. Of course, Russian intent of securing the de facto independence of the two 
regions, underlined by the subsequent recognition thereof by the resolution of the Duma, was 
clear. However, the setting of the Russia-Georgia war had been established decade and half 
before, during a bloody and mutually brutal separatist war. While the insistence of President 
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Saakashvili on territorial integrity of his country was understandable, it was the Georgian 
military action which attempted to change the long established (if legally non-sanctioned) 
status quo. Russia eagerly jumped on the opportunity which opened before her and clearly 
exceeded the scope of purely defensive reaction, but it would be difficult to categorize its 
action as unprovoked territorial aggression. 
 
In March 1999, NATO started aerial bombing of selected targets across the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that the operation was carried out without 
the UN Security Council authorization, it resulted in the establishment of a UN mandated 
peacekeeping mission and international administration. While none of these officially 
supported the separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia, they undoubtedly created the 
necessary conditions for the declaration of independence in 2008. Is it enough to warrant an 
equation with the recent developments in Crimea? Hardly. The fight for independence in 
Kosovo was incited by the curtailment of its autonomy by Milosevic’s regime after 1989. On 
the contrary, Crimea has enjoyed an autonomous status since its incorporation into Ukraine 
in 1954, which was in fact greatly expanded during 1990s, with Russian involvement and 
agreement. After all, current motion for independence is formally promoted by the elected 
officials of the autonomous republic.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, NATO’s intervention in (or rather, over) Kosovo came 
after several years of armed skirmishes and a year of intense fighting which resulted in a 
brutal Serbian campaign against the Albanian population. While we can endlessly discuss the 
legitimacy of NATO’s campaign, armed force in Kosovo was used to protect civilian 
population against state-sanctioned violence and none of the intervening countries had any 
territorial claims against or disputes with the target of the operation. Russian invasion of 
Crimea cannot credibly claim any comparable justification – to which its propagandistic 
effort to fabricate one is in direct proportion. 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, current Russian behaviour revived the analogy of Soviet 
interventions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956. While understandable and 
useful to channel the moral outrage, both are inaccurate when it comes to understanding the 
strategic context. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were not only in the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence (as Ukraine was until the recent turmoil), they were ruled over by effective 
branches of the Soviet communist leadership. It does not make these attempts to cast away 
the yoke of obedience to Moscow any less daring and the subsequent resistance against 
occupation (especially in Hungary) any less respectable – quite to the opposite. However, in 
terms of established rules and norms of the Cold War system, the Soviet actions did not 
threaten the basic tenets of international order. The Soviets effectively called the US 
“rollback” rhetoric bluff in 1956 – but given the balance of military power, cemented by the 
deployment of nuclear weapons, such an outcome was hardly surprising or challenging. The 
strategic context in 2014 is different and Ukraine can hardly be considered an unquestionable 
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part of Russian sphere of dominance where the use of force is expected and at least tacitly 
accepted. In short, Crimea is not Chechnya.    
 
Munich Agreement has probably become the most favourite of analogies supplied by the 
tumultuous 20
th
 century. Aggressive territorial claims by a neighbouring power against a 
weaker opponent and rhetorical protection of national brethren seemingly make Munich an 
ideal candidate for shedding light on the current conflict. But the analogy does not withstand 
closer scrutiny. It is of course the ‘agreement’ part which makes the difference. Munich was 
a great power compact to accommodate territorial claims of one of them at the expense of a 
third party. While the seemingly hesitant reactions of some European and US leaders provide 
welcome ammunition for their opponents and critics, they have not resulted in anything akin 
to a mutually agreed acceptance of the results of Russian actions. Sceptics might point out 
that this may still be the result due to an inherent weakness of the West, but such an outcome 
is in fact highly unlikely. Even if the international community, headed by prominent NATO 
and EU members, fails in its effort to return to status quo ante bellum, such a failure does not 
automatically equal formally sanctioning the situation on the ground. Moreover, while the 
Munich Conference took place under an imminent threat of general war in Europe, no such 
outlook realistically exists today.  
 
Before concluding that we have run out of helpful analogies, it is worth considering another 
case from Hitler’s playbook, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. While the event 
does not offer much insight when it comes to details (to Germany, Rhineland, unlike Crimea 
to Russia, was not a foreign territory), it is extremely important for the assessment of 
strategic implications. Remilitarization of Rhineland sent a clear, unequivocal message that 
Hitler was not willing to respect the essential rules and norms of the international order built 
after 1919. Putin has done exactly the same during the last weeks. This does not make him or 
his regime comparable to the 20
th
 century’s ultra-villain, but it does put contemporary Russia 
in a position of a revisionist power. Quarter century after the end of Cold War, this is a 
discomforting discovery which begs further explanation, without which it is hard to arrive at 
the right conclusions concerning desirable counteraction.  
 
 
Days of Future Past: Russia as a Revisionist Power 
 
Soviet Union unilaterally ceased control of its Central and Eastern European satellites in 
1989 and dissolved in a largely peaceful manner two years later. In the same year, Russia 
started its cooperation with NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later 
renamed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and in 1994 it joined the Partnership for Peace. 
One year later, a Russian brigade deployed alongside US, Turkish and Nordic-Polish 
counterparts in the Multi-National Division (North) in Tuzla, as part of the IFOR operation 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed a Founding Act on Mutual 
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Relations, Cooperation and Security, elevated to the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. Despite 
opposition to NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia, Russian soldiers participated in the 
ensuing KFOR mission and Russia also supported the coalition and NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan after 2001. In the light of current developments, a question is inescapable: what 
went wrong? 
 
Numerous analyses, articles and books will be written in the years to come about the current 
crisis – that much is certain. With the benefit of hindsight, they will be able to pin down 
specific reasons, motives, circumstances and processes which converged in the escalation of 
events into a full-fledged confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine. It is 
precarious to attempt explanations while the fray is still in motion. However, in strategic 
terms, the general logic of the run-up to the crisis looks surprisingly clear – especially when 
compared to similar situations in the past.  
 
The aforementioned events from the recent history of the NATO-Russia relationship form an 
integral part of the conclusion to the preceding systemic conflict – the Cold War. Over the 
course of two previous centuries, there are three additional examples which fit this category: 
the reconstitution of the concert of great powers after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the set 
of peace treaties and the establishment of the League of Nations following the end of World 
War I, and the new global order established after World War II.  
 
With the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to claim that the events and their aftermath 
offer a singularly persuasive argument: indecisive victories are followed by hesitant 
socialization of the defeated side which in turn resorts to revisionist policies in an effort to 
return to its ‘rightful’ position. On the contrary, decisive victories are followed by successful 
socialization of the losing party, including further integrative impulses. The defeats of 
Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany can be regarded as total and definitive. Not only were 
their armed forces crushed in battle, but the countries were subsequently occupied (partially, 
in the case of France after 1815) and, most importantly, the constitutive ideas of their 
previous regimes were resolutely uprooted. While this development went much further in the 
case of post-WWII Germany, in both cases the victors gained enough confidence to show 
considerable amount of largesse. Soon after the end of war, reconstituted royalist France and 
democratic West Germany returned as equals to form important components of the newly 
constituted international order. Above all, this solution allowed the one-time enemies to 
reach new, sometimes surprisingly robust levels of mutual trust. 
 
Situation after World War I offers an entirely different picture. Germany was defeated and 
its wartime regime fell, but subsequent efforts to subdue it during peacetime through 
reparations, territorial curtailment and limitations of military power failed to achieve the 
desired end-state. Even though the negotiations for readmission of Germany to the system 
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started only several years after the end of war, it was too late – the seeds of discontent 
already took hold there and blossomed after the rise of the Nazis.  
 
It seems the initial humiliation just after the war stimulated too much resentment to be 
balanced by the relative openness of the second half of 1920s. Perhaps the crucial lesson 
from the mismanagement of German revisionism is the importance of timing: Both 
socialization and retribution had their place in the construction of the new international 
system, but both seem to have been applied at exactly the wrong time. More generosity was 
clearly needed just after the war, to support those elements in German society and politics 
willing to join in. When France and Britain finally showed willingness to renegotiate the deal 
in 1925, their action was already perceived as weakness, not good will. After 1933, the effort 
to finally accommodate Germany’s demands proved tragically naive in the face of Hitler’s 
intentions.  
 
Soviet Union suffered a ‘soft defeat’ in 1989 which was unlike anything experienced in the 
three aforementioned cases. However, the logic of incomplete victory and insufficient 
socialization still applies. Despite all institutional and procedural overtures from NATO and 
the West in general, Russia was never treated with the respect of a defeated but still great 
power – at least in Russian eyes. It was relegated to a relic of the former superpower, a 
leftover from a failed idea. On the whole, the Western approach could be described as 
haughty neglect. The idea that Russia should be integrated to the system as equal (like 
France was after 1815) would have seemed outrageous to those countries which have just 
shed the Soviet rule – and yet it was probably the only meaningful way of socializing Russia 
fully into the new system. Like in the case of post-WWI Germany, the window of 
opportunity was very narrow and lasted for just several years at the beginning of 1990s. At 
that time, Russia was offered equal treatment similar to other post-communist societies but 
unlike the countries in Central and Eastern Europe it was denied the vision of EU and NATO 
membership. Perhaps it would have rejected it anyway, but the option was never seriously 
considered. 
 
Just as the end of Cold War was tamer by several orders of magnitude than the carnage of 
WWI, so is Putin’s Russia only a shade of threat which crystallized in Germany under Hitler. 
What matters, however, is not the intensity but the overall direction of Russia’s external 
policies. At this moment it is clear that they have reached the level when Moscow is willing 
and able to test and challenge the established rules of the game – just as Berlin was during 
the first years of Hitler’s rule. The historical context has shifted and makes it hard to imagine 
large military confrontation between Russia and Europe/NATO, but the logic of revisionism 
remains the same. Russia’s socialization into the new European system built since the end of 
Cold War has failed, and NATO and other components of the Euro-Atlantic community 
must find ways of dealing with this unhappy state of affairs. 
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Beyond Ukraine: Containment as the Next Step in NATO-
Russia Relations 
 
Unfortunately, the dominant element of the discourse in the face of recent Russian 
aggression against Ukraine is the fear of escalation. Based on the previous analysis, such 
stance fits the current stage of development of Russia-West relations very poorly. Russian 
leadership has willingly opted for the revisionist strategy, so escalation already happened – 
from their side. Negotiations can and must be part of the reaction to the developments, but 
they should not be regarded as an end in its own right. Like Germany in 1936, Russia has 
just knowingly breached one of the key norms of the international order – and those 
attacked, including NATO and the EU, must respond accordingly. If the West does not push 
back, it will end up being pushed aside.  
 
The international community, led by the US and prominent EU members, should first and 
foremost signal to Russia that its heavy-handed meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs will no 
longer be tolerated. Preferences and well-being of the pro-Russian segment of Ukrainian 
population, including the inhabitants of Crimea, must be of course duly taken into account. 
To handle the current crisis, international negotiations are needed and Russia can and should 
participate in them – but not while it simultaneously militarily supports a secessionist 
movement in the country.  
 
While Crimea is effectively lost to Russian control at the moment, Europe and the US should 
make it perfectly clear to Moscow that by siding with the separatists it shuts itself out from 
future influence in Ukraine as a whole. Full territorial integrity of Ukraine free of all external 
military interference must be claimed as a starting point, not an outcome of the negotiations. 
Russian offensive must be contained with financial (instant economic support), diplomatic 
(political support to the new Ukrainian government) and strategic (reformulation of 
Ukraine’s prospects vis-à-vis the EU) means. 
 
NATO – as a military alliance and defence organization – can and should play a pivotal role 
in the reaction. The Alliance must offer necessary training, financial and advisory support for 
the Ukrainian armed forces to be able to secure the territory of the state. Demonstrative 
strengthening of NATO’s posture and level of alertness should be automatic components of 
the overall reaction. 
 
Ukraine’s internal divisions complicate things greatly, but the crisis offers the European 
Union and NATO a strong opportunity to rethink their reluctant stance towards its (as well as 
other countries’) membership. The main thesis of the European Neighbourhood Policy, that 
post-Soviet countries between the EU and Russia can integrate into Europe without the 
prospect of future membership, has taken a serious blow. Time has come to support the pro-
European forces in the neighbourhood by reconsidering this position.  
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In a wider international context, Russian aggression should be presented and raised as an 
issue at appropriate international fora, including the UN Security Council and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. If Russia does not reverse its course, 
members of its ruling elite should be subjected to targeted sanctions. Extensive trade 
embargo is hard to imagine, but there are other means to convey the depth of Europe’s and 
the United States’ dissatisfaction. For instance, even if the ongoing operations of Russian 
companies are not directly targeted, the Euro-Atlantic community could agree on a ‘closure’ 
that would exclude Russian businesses from any further extension of their activities which is 
mandated by a public policy decision. In other words, Russian companies would not be 
allowed to participate in state-organized tenders, including those in the energy sector. Russia 
may be an important market for European companies, but the logic is even more relevant the 
other way round. Europe should muster enough courage and solidarity to make Russia, and 
the Russians, feel that the continuation of Putin’s adventures relegates the country to an 
international pariah.  
 
The risks of escalation are not negligible, but at the moment the risks of inaction or feeble 
response are much greater. If unopposed, Putin’s regime’s next move will clearly consist in 
undermining the new Ukrainian government, thus either plunging the country into an even 
deeper crisis (potentially ending with its separation), or tie it to the Russian orbit under much 
stricter terms than it ever has been since its independence. Neither result is acceptable to 
Europe and the US.  
 
Like Stalin, Putin does not act out of insatiable thirst for aggression; his motives are likely 
primarily defensive, realizing that the successful overthrow of Yanukovych’s regime might 
spell trouble for his own rule. From this perspective, his moves can easily be understood as 
preventive distraction of the domestic audience from internal problems to external threats. 
But even if this explanation is true, it does not warrant lenience on the part of the Euro-
Atlantic community. Putin is not the only, and maybe not even the most relevant audience of 
its actions. The current international order is still ‘Western’ in many of its key characteristics 
and it is in the utmost interest of the Euro-Atlantic community to fight for its preservation. 
 
Like his one-time KGB mentors, Putin’s strategy relies on fear, including the fear of the 
costs of the defence measures. One of the general ways through which NATO communicated 
its resolve to the Soviet Union during the Cold War was by demonstrating its willingness to 
bear the expenses of the competition. The US, NATO and the European Union stand at an 
important crossroad, one that seems to come at exactly the wrong moment. The public is 
tired of previous military operations like Afghanistan, the economy has just barely recovered 
from the previous recession and the resources for decisive foreign policy action are 
diminishing. We should, however, heed the warning of the 1930s, when economic malaise 
and political fatigue eased the way for Hitler’s rise. Putin is not nearly as menacing as Hitler 
and Russian power should not be exaggerated, but not opposing the revisionist tendencies 
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could still empower other actors who seek to undermine the international consensus built 
since the end of Cold War. Despite the apparent costs, the Euro-Atlantic community should 
muster all its will and resources to counter such trends. 
 
 
Conclusion: Victory through Strength, Peace through 
Integration  
 
It does not end with the show of resoluteness. The ultimate goal is not to ‘defeat’ Russia 
(after all, the Soviet Union was already defeated) but to defend the current international 
system against a serious breach. The West should recall NATO’s double-track decision from 
1979 which combined explicit resolve to counter the Soviet moves with an offer to negotiate 
the critical issues. There is no a priori reason why Russia’s economic, cultural and even 
political influence should be completely shut out from Ukraine, or the rest of its near abroad. 
However, it must conform to the established European and international standards. In other 
words, everything should be negotiable, but never under duress.  
 
If the West wins this round of confrontation (and there is much to fear if it does not), the 
worst thing it could do would be to subsequently label Russia as an irreconcilable, perennial 
enemy. History of international relations does not offer many clear-cut lessons, but the one 
from post-WWII Western Europe is evident: The only known form of perpetually 
overcoming enmity, distrust and fear of war in interstate relations is deep integration. Once 
the current phase of conflict between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia is over, 
victorious West will have to start handling an even more challenging issue – how to 
stimulate Russian socialization and integration into Europe which so manifestly failed in the 





The author wishes to express his thanks to Václav Lídl and Jakub Záhora, both affiliated 
with the AMO Research Center, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
  13 
Policy Paper 1/2014 
 
NATO and Russia after Crimea: 




ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AMO) 
 
Association for International Affairs (AMO) is a preeminent independent think-tank in the 
Czech Republic in the field of foreign policy. Since 1997, the mission of AMO has been to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of international affairs through a broad range of 
educational and research activities. Today, AMO represents a unique and transparent 
platform in which academics, business people, policy makers, diplomats, the media and 
NGO’s can interact in an open and impartial environment. 
 
In order to achieve its goals AMO strives to: 
 formulate and publish briefings, research and policy papers; 
 arrange international conferences, expert seminars, roundtables, public debates; 
 organize educational projects; 
 present critical assessment and comments on current events for local and 
international press; 
 create vital conditions for growth of a new expert generation; 
 support the interest in international relations among broad public; 
 cooperate with like-minded local and international institutions. 
 
RESEARCH CENTER 
Founded in October 2003, the AMO‘s Research Center has been dedicated to pursuing 
research and raising public awareness of international affairs, security and foreign policy. 
The Research Center strives to identify and analyze issues crucial to Czech foreign policy 
and the country‘s position in the world. To this end, the Research Center produces 
independent analyses; encourages expert and public debate on international affairs; and 
suggests solutions to tackle problems in today‘s world. The Center‘s activities can be divided 
into two main areas: first, it undertakes research and analysis of foreign policy issues and 
comments on AMO blog; and second, it fosters dialogue with the policy-makers, expert 
community, and broad public. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
